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N. Y. State Legislative Commission
October 1, 1991
New York City, NY
Immigration Policy and the Labor Force of New York
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the United States economy has witnessed the revival of
one of its most distinguishing features: Mass immigration. Indeed, a recent comprehensive
studY of U. S. society, conducted by an international team of social science scholars,
concluded that "at a time when attention is directed to the general decline in American
immigration continues to flow at a rate unknown elsewhere in the world. ,,\ The prospect for
the foreseeable future is for a continuation -- and probable acceleration -- of the
phenomenon.
Public recognition that immigration has once again assumed a prominent role in the
U.S. economy however, has been slow to develop. Immigration had significantly declined
in importance from the 1920s through to the mid-1960s. As officially measured, the foreign
born percentage of the population had steadily fallen from 13.2 percent in 1920 to 4.7
percent in 1970. The foreign born population in 1980, however, rose to 6.2 percent of the
population (a 46 percent increase over the 1970 figure). Given policy developments during
the 1980s, the figure for 1990 could easily approach 8.5 percent (or almost one of every
eleven persons in the U.S. population). Even these national percentages are suspected of
being too low due to the belief that there was a significant undercount of illegal immigrants
by the 1980 Census and the anticipation of similar problems in the 1990 Census.2
Mass immigration does not receive more attention because the impact is
geographically concentrated. Six states -- California, New York, Florida, Texas, New
Jersey, and Illinois -- account for 38 percent of the U.S. population but 79 percent of all
2legal immigrants admitteD to the U.S. in 1989. They probably account for at least the same
proponion of illegal immigrants.
Moreover, within the states, immigrants have overwhelmingly settled in urban areas.
They are essentially "an urban phenomenon.113 In 1980, 92 percent of the foreign born
population that was actually counted by the Census lived in metropolitan areas compared to
only 72 percent of the native born population. The actual urban impact of immigration is
even more concentrated. Five metropOlitan areas in 1980 (New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, San Francisco, and Miami) accounted for 40 percent of the nation's foreign
population born but only 11 percent of the native born population. As regards central cities,
eight (the tive listed in the proceeding sentence plus Houston, San Diego, and Philadelphia)
had morc than 100,000 foreign born persons residing within them. These eight central
cities, however, accounted for over 26 percent of the foreign born population. The city with
the highest percentage was Miami (53.7 percent). Given the scale of immigration
developments in the 1980s and what is now legislatively in place for the 1990's, these
numbers and percentages have certainly increased and will continue to do so. These urban
areas are the largest labor markets in the U. S. economy. Hence, there is national as well as
local significance to these developments.
New York is an excellent case in point. The state has always been a primary
receiver of immigrants. In 1960, the foreign born population accounted for 12.5 percent of
the state's population. By 1980, the percentage should be in excess of 17 percent. Within
the state. it has been New York City, of course, that has traditionally borne the bulk of the
accommodation pressure. In 1960, 20 percent of the City's population were foreign born;
by 1980 the percentage had risen to 23.6 percent (almost 4 times the national percentage).
The 1990 Census should reveal that about 30 percent of the City's population will be foreign
born (or about one of every 3 New York City residents). Even these high percentages are
believed to be too low due to the widely perceived notion of an extensive undercount of
3illegal immigrants in the City's population and work force. (For example, City officials
estimated that only 200,000 of the 750,000 illegal immigrants in New York City were
counted In the 1980 Census).4 Thus, New York City accounted for slightly over 70 percent
of the New York State's total foreign born population. Of the immigrants who have moved
into New York State since 1965, 80 percent have settled in New York City with an
additional 13 percent moving into its adjacent suburbs. It is not surprising, therefore, that a
1988 study of immigration concluded that "immigration into New York State is almost
entirely immigration into New York City and its suburbs. ,,5
The sheer magnitude of the immigrant flow -- especially into a state like New York -
- is sufficient cause to review the intentions of the nation's existing immigration policy.
But, given the fact that mass immigration is occurring at a time when the labor markets of
the nation in general and of New York in particular are both in a stage of radical
transformation, uncertainty about the human capital characteristics of the immigrant flow
adds necessity to such an inquiry. Old industries that once provided an almost insatiable
demand for immigrants as well as for many native born workers are now in a stage of sharp
employment contraction. New industries have developed but they often have employment
requirements that make it difficult for many citizens and immigrants to qualify. Hence, ease
of labor force adjustment cannot simply be assumed.
Perceptions of the Role of Immigration Policy
It is precisely because of the issue of labor market transformation that the issue of
labor shortages has arisen. A transformation means a rapid break from the slow
evolutionary patterns of change. In such a context, the relevant question is: are there actual
shortages of workers because there are simply not enough of them or is there a mismatch
that involves shortages of qualified workers co-existing with surpluses of unqualified
workers or would-be workers?
4If the issue the former, than the prevailing unguided immigration policy of the United
States is acceptable. There are millions of people who want to immigrate to the United
States, so just let some of them in. There is no need to be picky about their skill,
education. fluency in English, or where they wish to settle. Indeed, just such a course of
action is precisely what the Wall Street Journal has recently advocated in an irresponsible
editorial saying that the United States should simply admit everyone in the World who wants
to enter.~
If it is the latter case, however, a diametrically different policy is required. The
existence of a mismatch mean" that the nation should have a carefully administered and
flexible immigration policy. Immigration could provide a means of filling job vacancies in
the short run while long run domestic human resource development policies are adopted to
prepare the native born population for these emerging jobs. The mismatch scenario also has
a vital corollary. It is that immigration policy should also be used to keep-out those persons
who lack the skills and education to qualify for the new types of jobs that are emerging.
Admitting such persons would only hinder efforts to upgrade the employability of the native
born population who require adjustment assistance in a period of economic flux. Moreover,
such immigrants, if admitted, would increase the competition for a diminishing number of
jobs with the native born who are being displaced and are also unprepared for the newly
created jobs. If there is a racial dimension to the mismatch scenario, -- and in New York
City there surely is, it is imperative that priority be given to preparing those minority groups
who are native born who are being adversely affected for the newly created jobs.
Immigration policy should not be allowed to sabotage this incorporation process. On the
positive side, the mismatch scenario means that the nation and the City are confronted with
a golden opportunity to rid themselves of the real threat of economic polarization along
racial lines. Jobs exist for workers who can be trained and educated to fill them.
5Thus, immigration policy is emerging as a critical element of both national economic
and social policies. How immigration policy should be shaped, therefore. depends directly
upon how one interprets the prevailing economic trends and domestic social conditions.
The Anomalies of Immigration Policymaking
Although immigration policy is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, it has -- since
a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the late 19th Century -- become the sole
policymaking province of federal government. But because "everyone has to be
somewhere," the actual impact of immigration policy is played-out in those states and their
respective cities and towns where the immigrants actually reside. Thus, policymakers in
state and local governments can only respond to what the federal government decides to do
(or not to do) with immigration policy at any given time. Neither the level nor the human
capital attributes of these immigrant flows are within the policymaking domains of these
receiving states or communities to shape. Policy responsibility, in other words, does not
correspond with the levels of government confronted with the consequences of policy design.
Immigrants in mass numbers can themselves cause changes in labor market conditions
as well as respond to prevailing conditions. Immigration is the one aspect of population and
labor force growth that public policy should be able to control. Most of the other key
factors -- fertility, mortality, emigration, internal migration and the whole range of labor
force participation issues dealing with population demographics (e.g., those characteristics
associated with age, gender, and race) are not directly controllable in a fre-e society. To
date. however, federal policymakers in the United States have been unwilling to view
lmmigratlOn policy as a form of e{;onomic policy. The design of immigration policy is
largely dominated by political objectives that are intended to appease powerful special
interest groups. These fragmented groups have manifested little, if any, concern for the
national interest. They, have also found that by working together they can form a powerful
coalition. The result is that immigration policy is not responsible for its sizable economic
6consequences. Less than 4 % of the immigrants and refugees who are legally admitted to the
United States each year are admitted on the basis that the skills and educations they possess
are actually believed to be in demand by U.S. employers. The percentage is considerably
less than 1% if illegal immigrants are included in the total immigrant flow. In addition,
little serious effort is made to find out if citizen workers could be used to fill jobs for which
non-immigrant foreign workers are currently being recruited and employed by U.S.
industries. The newly enacted Immigration Act of 1990 (which goes into effect on October
1, 1991) will D.Q!change this basic thrust of prevailing policy.
The immigrant flow -- in all of its diverse forms -- accounts for anywhere from one-
quarter to one-third of the annual growth of the U.S. labor force. The presence of a
considerable number of illegal immigrants complicates efforts to be precise. It is highly
probable that, when the female labor force participation rate (that have been rising for
several decades) eventually stabilizes and when the flow of "baby boomers" into the work
force begins to add (as it now doing), immigration could, by the turn of the 21st Century,
comprise almost all of the annual growth of the nation's labor force. Thus, the critical
importance of adopting a rational basis for the nation's immigration policy should be
apparent.
The Extant Immigration System: Its Priorities and Indifferences
There is no simple or quick way to describe the process by which immigrants enter
the labor force and population of the United States. The complexity is, of course, one of
the reasons there are please for reform. Few policy makers and even fewer citizens
understand what the existing admission practices are. As with the tax laws and the welfare
laws, the nation's extant immigration system is the cumulative collection over the years of a
hodge-podge of dubious political compromises. Also like the tax and welfare systems, the
immigration system suffers from considerable abuse due to enforcement laxities and legal
limitations inherent in a free society.
7A comprehensive discussion of the history of the immigration policy of the United
States is beyond present purposes.7 Succinctly stated, the primary rationale for legal
admission is family reunification. Eighty percent of the immigrants are given on this
nepotistic basis as they will continue to be when the new legislation goes into effect on
October 1, 1991. Family reunification, in this case, refers to the admission of adult
children over the age of 21 of U.S. citizens; spouses and unmarried children of permanent
resident aliens; and adult brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens. the complex admission
system, however, is easily circumvented by persons who simply enter illegally. They do not
concern themselves with whether they are needed but rather they come and join the
competitive lottery for whatever jobs or means of survival they can find. Relatedly, the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) provided provisions for about 3.2 million
former illegal aliens to adjust to a legal status. In addition, the Refugee Act of 1980
removed refugees from the legal immigration system where they had been since 1965 and
created an entirely separate system for their admission. The number permitted to enter each
year is set by the President after a largely pro forma consultation with Congress. The
President is under enormous political pressure by various religious, ethnic, and human rights
organizations to admit large numbers of persons -- especially those with whom these groups
have special interests. Obviously, there is no labor market test associated with refugee and
asylee admissions. Immigration policy also permits a substantial number of foreign persons
to work in the United States as non-immigrant workers. In most cases --but not all -- U.S.
employers are supposed to seek citizen workers to fill those jobs before turning to non-
immigrants but, in actuality, this often is not the case.
What is missing in the formulation of U. S. immigration policy, since its accidental
revival of mass immigration in the mid-1960s, is an appreciation for the radical changes that
are occurring in the nation's labor market. For despite the reasons that they enter, all must
work or be supported by those who do.
8The Changing Nature of the U.S. Labor Market
The United States had entered its post-industrial stage of economic development.
The goods producing industries -- which had been the major employment sector throughout
U. S. history have declined significantly. Agriculture has been a negative source of
employment every year since the late 1940s. It provides jobs for less than 3 percent of the
labor force. Likewise, manufacturing -- especially its blue co11aroccupational categories --
has been, since the mid-1950s, in sharp relative decline (accounting in the late 1980s for less
than 20 percent of the employed labor force). Employment in mining has also fallen
sharpl y. The construction industry has shown modest employment increases but it is an
industry that is subject to frequent cyclical fluctuations.
The dramatic fall-off in employment in the goods producing industries has been
sparked by the introduction of new forms of computer controlled technology. With
computer technology, an electronic "mind" has been created for coordinating, guiding, and
evaluation most routine operations. With the introduction of a vast array of mechanical and
electrical substitutes for the human nero-muscular system, it is now possible to link these
new computer-driven machines together into self-regulating systems that can perform an
enormous variety of work tasks. All of this is taking place in an environment of
unprecedented international competition which was not present at any earlier time when mass
immigration occurred.
Thus, the new technology and the international competitive pressures mean that high
paying jobs for poorly skilled and inadequately educated workers are largely a thing of the
paSt. As former Secretary of Labor William E. Brock aptly said in 1987, "the days of
disguising functional illiteracy with a high paying assembly line job that simply requires a
manual skill are soon to be over."s The new technology is creating new jobs but the growth
is concentrated in occupations that reward extensive training and education.9 It is unlikely in
the foreseeable future that there will be an abundance of unskilled jobs. But, unless public
9policy changes dramatically with regard both to labor force preparativeness and immigration
-
admissions, there is likely to be a chronic exce~s supply of unskilled job seekers. Worse
yet, there could be large numbers of unemployable persons discouraged from even seeking
employment in the legitimate labor market. 10
In the wake of the sharp declines in employment in the goods producing sector, there
have been dramatic increases in the service producing industries. Responding to major
shifts in consumer spending patterns, 76 percent of the U.S. labor force is now employed in
service industries. The U.S. Department of Labor projects that 90 percent of the new jobs
that will be created in the remainder of the 20th Century will be in the service industries."
Thus, the demand for labor is being radically restructured. The supply of labor is slowly
adapting but the adjustment process is not as easy nor is it as automatic as it was in earlier
eras in the nation's history.
The displaced workers from the agricultural sector in the early 20th Century had little
difficulty qualifying for newly created jobs in the burgeoning manufacturing sector. they
only had to relocate and, when immigration flows were sharply reduced between the 1920s
through to the 196Os, they tended to do so. But the emergence of the service economy has
imposed an entirely different set of job requirements on the actual and potential labor force.
While the technology of earlier periods stressed physical and manual skills for job seekers,
the service economy stresses mental, social, language, and communication skills. As a
consequence, the shift to services has meant declining job opportunities for those who lack
quality educations and good work skills. Tragically, a disproportionate number of those
who are vulnerable to such adverse employment effects are racial minorities, women and
youths. 12
Related to these dramatic trends in industrial employment patterns are the derivative
changes in occupational patterns. Since the early 1970s, over one-third of the growth in
employment has occurred in the professional, technical and related workers classifications.13
10
Other broad occupational groups experiencing substantially faster-than-average growth over
this period were managers, administrators, and service and sales workers. The greatest
decline in employment was among operatives, farmers, farm laborers, and private household
workers. The U.S. Department of Labor projects for the balance of this century that
occupational growth will continue to be extremely uneven. Occupations expected to
experience the most rapid growth over this period are those that require the most highly
educated workers. These include executives, administrators, and manager; professionals;
and technicians and related support workers. Collectively, these three occupational
categories accounted for 25 percent of total employment in 1986 but are expected to
constitute 40 percent of the nation's employment growth for the remainder of the century.
Absolute declines are projected for the lower skilled occupations in farming and private
household work, and only marginal growth is expected in the operative and laborer
occupations.
Without unduly belaboring the obvious, the critical conclusion is best summarized by
a Department of Labor study of anticipated occupational demand projections up to the year
2000: "It should be pointed out that the occupational clusters projected to decline or grow
slowly are generally those requiring the least amount of education and training and those
projected to grow the fastest require the most education and training. ,,14 Thus, the
occupational trends of the present and near future are apparent. The question is the ability
of the supply of labor to adequately respond.
The New York City Experience
The New York City labor market provides an excellent example of the twin effects of
rapid shifts in industrial employment patterns (on the demand side) and of mass immigration
(on the supply side).ls The New York City labor force, with about 3.2 million resident
workers and another 700,000 daily commuting workers from its suburbs, is larger than the
individual labor forces of 42 states. The City accounts for about 38 percent of the State's
11
labor force. The New York City SMSA also has the largest absolute number of foreign
born persons in its population in the nation (1.9 million persons in 1980). In addition to the
foreign born, the City also has about one million Puerto Ricans who, as citizens, are
counted among the native born.
Looking first at employment patterns, Table 1 shows that while employment in the
State has increased since 1960, virtually all of the growth has come outside the City of New
York. Secondly, it shows that the manufacturing sector of the City has drastically declined
but considerably less so in the balance of the State. Table 2 shows the employment trends
since 1960 for the nine industrial sectors for the City and for the balance of the State. The
long list of minus in the City's column tells a grim story. Only two of the eight private
sector industries have shown any absolute growth. Both of these growth industries are
disproportionately composed of white collar occupations. The public sector has sustained
marginal growth and one component -- federal employment -- is actually falling. Aside
from the devastating decline of manufacturing, the most disturbing revelation in Table 2 is
the fact that the retail and wholesale trade sectors both show minus figures for New York
City. This is shocking! Nationwide and in the balance of New York State, both of these
trade sectors are booming. The retail and wholesale trade are sectors that traditionally are
large employers of women, youth, minorities and part-time workers. They often provide
entry level jobs for large numbers of workers. Such no longer is the case in New York
City. Clearly, the industrial patterns are being radically transformed. There is serious
reason for concern over labor force adjustment in such circumstances.
On the labor supply side, the resident labor force essentially has no racial majority. 16
In 1987, 51 percent of the labor force were non-Hispanic whites; 21 percent were Hispanics;
and 29 percent were blacks and others (separate data for Asians were not tabulated). Fully,
75 percent of the State's minority population live in New York City and most of the
remainder live in the adjacent suburbs. The minorities are the fastest growing component in
State Minus
Industry/Years N.Y. State N.Y. City City
Total Nonagricultural
Employees
1960 6,181 3,538 2,643
1990 8.209 3.570 4.639
Difference +2,028 + 32 + 1,996
Manufacturing
1960 1,878 946 932
1990 Llli 336 795
Difference - 747 - 610 - 137
Nonmanufacturing
1960 4,303 2,591 1,712
1990 7.077 3.234 3.844
Difference +2,774 + 643 +2,132
Note: Parts my not equal totals due to rounding
Source: New York State Department of Labor
TABLE 1 12
'.
MANUFACTURING AND NONMANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES ON
NONAGRICULTURAL PAYROLLS IN NEW YORK STATE, NEW YORK
CITY, AND STATE MINUS CITY TOTALS, 1960 AND 1990
TABLE 2
EMPLOYEES ON NONAGRICULTURAL PAYROLLS IN NEW YORK 13
STATE, NEW YORK CITY, AND STATE MINUS CITY TOTALS,
1960 AND 1990
(in thousands)
State Minus
Industry/Y cars N. Y. State N.Y. City City
Manufacturing
1960 1,878 946 932
1990 1.131 336 795
Difference
-
747 - 610
-
137
Mining
1960 9 2 7
1990 ~1* !
Difference 4 1 3
Construction
1960 266 127 139
1990 314 113 201
Difference + 48 14 + 62
Transportation, Communication,
& Public Utilities
1960 482 318 164
1990 428 225 W
Difference 54 93 + 39
Wholesale Trade
1960 420 315 105
1990 466 219 247
Difference + 46 96 + 142
Retail Trade
1960 831 430 401
1990 1.129 386 833
Difference + 388 44 + 432
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
1960 480 384 96
1990 777 517 22Q
Difference + 297 + 133 + 164
Personal Services
1960 978 607 371
1990 2.396 L.JM .L.m
Difference + 1,418 + 556 + 862
Government
1960 837 408 429
1990 1.472 608
~Difference + 635 + 200 + 435
* Actual number is considerably less than 1.NOte: Parts my not equal totals due to rounding
Source: New York State Department of Labor
14
the State~s population. It is an ominous sign that the minority populations disproportionately
live and seek work in the City's labor market where there has been virtually no absolute
growth in the number of jobs; where radical shifts in the industrial employment patterns are
occurring; and where entry level jobs are vanishing.
Since less than four percent of New York City residents seek employment outside the
City, it is important to try to explain how the labor force is responding to these sweeping
changes. Figure 1 shows the unemployment trends and the labor force participation trends
for the City relative to the U. S. It is of particular note to see that the unemployment rates
in New York City have recently been below those of the United States. No doubt, it is this
relationship that has generated the perception that there is a labor shortage in the City. But
when the trends in labor force participation rates are examined, the New York City trends
are sharply divergent from those of the nation. The national labor force participation rates
in the 1980s are following the predicted course taught in the labor economics textbook: as
unemployment falls, labor force participation rises. But in New York City, the falling
unemployment rate has been accompanied by sharply declining labor force participation
rates. Figure 2 shows an even worse picture. It traces the labor force participation trends
for 16 to 19 year olds in the nation and in New York City. The figure for youth in New
York City for 1987 is more than 32 percent below from the national average for comparably
aged youth. The participation rates are even lower for minorities (see Table 3). Thus, this
data suggests that a massive withdrawal from the labor force is in progress in the City.
This mass discouragement is a symptom of the existence of a mismatch between the types of
jobs available and the lack of qualifications of potential job seekers. It means that many
persons of working age are either unemployable or they have become discouraged from
seeking work. It is also a sign of a growing underclass with strong radically divisive
implications.
15
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FIG URE 2
YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AlSD LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
--RATES, UNITED STATES AND NEW YORK CITY, 1967-1988
(BOTH SEXES, AGES 16 TO 19 YEARS OLD)
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TAB LE 3
CIYILIA~ L~E:\1PLOY\1E;\JT RATES AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
RATES, BY RACE AND GENDER, UNITED STATES AND
NEW YORK CITY, 1987 AND 1988
Clylli,n un.-ploy8efttrites ,nd
"bOr for~ ~rt1c1p.t10n rites.
United SUtes And Mew Yort Clt1
Source: U.S. Depanment of Labor
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As for the role of immigration. the available date shows that immigrants are highly
concentrated into only a handful of industries. As shown in Table 4, almost one half (47
percent) of all post 1965 immigrants are employed in only 13 industries of over 200
industries for which such data are collected. These 13 industries, accounted in 1980 for
34.8 percent of all the jobs in the City. Table 4 also shows the inordinately high
penetration of immigrant workers into both declining industries (such as manufacturing,
private household work and retail businesses) as well as growth industries (such as hospitals,
banking, real estate, insurance, and motels and hotels) in New York City. The Office of
Immigrant Affairs for New York City, which compiled and released this data in 1987,
warned that "because the census omitted the majority of undocumented aliens and because
some are employed off the books, the concentration of immigrants in those industries may
be even higher than censusdata suggest.,,17 Indeed, the number of illegal immigrants is so
large that a recent New York Times article quoted an illegal immigrant as complaining that
there are too many other illegal immigrants in the City. He said "There are too many
looking for work" and that "it's filling up here. ,,18 Given the huge immigrant flows that
have occurred since 1980, it is certain that the 1990 Census will reveal even larger
concentrations of immigrant workers.
With immigrant concentrations of this magnitude, it is hard to argue that the presence
of immigrant workers is not affecting both wage levels and employment opportunities in
these particular industries over what might prevail in their absence. It is worth noting in
passing, that the study also found striking "ethnic demarcation lines" between which
immigrants were employed in which industry and which were not.19
Because the decline in employment is so pervasive, many immigrants are in direct
competition with the city's considerable unskilled and poorly educated native born population
for the jobs that remain in the declining sectors of the economy. A disproportionately high
number are minorities, women, and youth. As these urban groups are rapidly growing, the
Post-1965
Immigrants Employed
Percent
Total of Total
Industry Employed Number Employed
Total for all industries 2,897,880 492,7riJ 17.0
Apparel manufacturing 118,540 42,7riJ 36.1
Hospitals 185,820 41,660 22.4
Eating/drinking establishments 110,640 36,820 33.3
Banking 125,320 21,540 17.2
Construction 77,960 15,120 19.4
Real estatelbuilding management 71,660 11,540 16.1
Private households 30,620 11,520 37.6
Nursing facilities 30,960 9,820 31.7
Miscellaneous manufacturing 32,080 9,520 29.7
Grocery stores 47,040 8,920 19.0
Insurance 76,980 8,720 11.3
Motelslhotels 25,420 7,8fIJ 30.9
Printing/publishing 74,280 7,7(fJ 10.4
Tatal 1,007,320 233,560 23.2
All other industries 1,890,560 259,200 13.7
Source:
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TABLE 4
NE\V YORK CITY INDUSTRIES \VITH CONCENTRATIONS
OF NEW IMMIGRANTS, 1980
(in rank order by number ofpost-1965 immigrants employed)
Elizabeth Bogen, Immiwation in New York (New York: Praeger Publish~rs,
a division of Greenwood Press, Inc., 1987) p. 85. The data in the Table IS
tabulated from the 1980 U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Samples.
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last thing they need is more competition from unskilled immigrants for the declining number
of low skilled jobs that provide a liveable income or for the limited opportunities for
training and education that are available. Many immigrants -- especially those from Third
World backgrounds -- will do whatever it takes to survive. They will double up families in
apartments, work dual jobs, have several family members in the labor force, (including
minor children), and accept substandard wages and working conditions. These are the
characteristics of labor markets in contemporary Third World nations. Yet these appalling
living and working conditions -- are being revived once more in the nation's largest city.20
It should not be surprising that many citizen New Yorkers simply cannot or will not
compete for jobs on such demeaning and often unfair terms. For too many citizens, the
options are unemployment, or welfare, or participation in the City's enormous "irregular"
econom y.
It is true that some immigrants do create some new enterprises in the City that are
designed to serve the needs of people from the same ethnic background. These small shops,
bars, restaurants, and foreign language media would probably not exist without the growing
presence of more immigrants. But that conclusion raises the more basic question: How
important would their loss be if they were not there? Moreover, while these ethnic
enterprises do provide employment opportunities for a sizeable number of immigrants, the
proliferation of immigrant-owned enterprises too often also means restricted job
opportunities for most others. They typically prefer to hire only workers of similar ethnic
backgrounds. The consequence is that "there are tens of thousands of jobs in New York for
which the native-born are not candidates. ,,21 Anti-discrimination laws typically do not apply
to enterprises that hire fewer than 15 employees. Many of these ethnic businesses,
therefore, are beyond the reach of the law regarding their discriminatory hiring practices.
Even for the many immigrant-owned enterprises with more than 15 employees, there appears
21
to be little interest among policymakers to attack discriminatory behaviors that are blatant
violations of national, state, and city policies. .
Concluding Observations
Immigration assumes a prominent position in any contemporary assessment of the
New York City labor market. As an international city, it is understandable that it would
also be an immigrant center. So the reason for concern is not one that pertains to the
presence of immigrants per se. Rather, it is the fact that immigration policy in the United
States has become essentially a political policy that is not held accountable for its economic
consequences.
Prevailing national immigration policies are out of step with the emerging
employment patterns in both New York City and New York State. Under existing
circumstances, immigration policy should be a targeted and flexible policy that is designed
to admit only persons who can fill job vacancies that require significant skill preparation and
educational investment. The number annually admitted should be far fewer than the actual
number needed. Immigration should never be allowed to dampen the market pressures needed
to encourage native born workers to invest in preparing for vocations that are expanding and
or to reduce the pressure on governmental bodies to provide them with needed human
resource development programs.
As it takes time for would-be workers to acquire skills and education, immigration
policy can be used on a short run basis to target experienced and qualified workers for
permanent settlement who possess such abilities. But it is the "preparedness", or lack
thereof, of significant segments of the existing urban labor force that is the fundamental
economic issue confronting many of these communities. It is not a shortage of workers ~
se.
The national goal must be to build a high wage, high productivity labor force.22 In
the process, the existence of shortages of qualified labor offers to this country a rare chance
22
,
to reduce its persistently high levels of unemployment; to improve the economic lot of its
worldng poor, and to reduce its large urban underclass. Such shortages can force public
human resource development policy and private sector employment practices to focus on the
necessity to incorporate into the mainstream economy many citizens who have been "left
out". Immigration policy must cease contributing to urban problems and, instead, be
redirected to become a source of solutions.
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